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Humans feel uncertain. They know when they do not
know or remember, and they respond well to uncertainty by
deferring response and seeking help or information. Their
responses to doubt and uncertainty ground research on metacognition, or thinking about thinking (Benjamin et al., 1998;
Flavell, 1979; Koriat, 1995; 2007; Koriat et al., 2006; Metcalfe, 2000; Nelson, 1992; Schwartz, 1994; Serra & Dunlosky, 2005). The idea in this field is that human minds have
a cognitive executive that looks in on thought to evaluate its
problems and prospects.
When humans behave metacognitively, scientists make
intriguing attributions about their minds. Metacognition
reveals hierarchical structure in mind (Nelson & Narens,
1990) because the executive oversees the rest of cognition.
Metacognition is linked to self-awareness (Gallup, 1982) because doubt is so personal and self-oriented. Metacognition
is linked to declarative consciousness (Koriat, 2007; Nelson, 1996) because we can introspect and declare states of
knowing. Thus, metacognition is a sophisticated capacity in
humans that might be uniquely human (Metcalfe & Kober,
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2005). This raises the question of whether nonhuman animals share that capacity.
To address this question, researchers have evaluated
whether animals can adaptively monitor and respond to their
uncertainty (e.g., Beran et al., 2006; Foote & Crystal, 2007;
Hampton, 2001; Kornell et al., 2007; Smith et al., 1995,
1998, 2006; Suda-King, 2008; Sutton & Shettleworth, 2008;
Washburn et al., 2006). The paradigms used in this research
have two key features. First, they contain a mix of easy and
difficult trials, the latter trial type so that researchers may
stir up something like an uncertainty state. Second, they
grant animals an additional response—beyond the primary
discrimination responses—with which they can decline to
complete trials of their choosing. This potentially lets them
handle uncertainty adaptively. Animals who monitor cognition should recognize difficult trials as error-risking and decline them selectively. Some animals do so, producing data
patterns in cognitive-monitoring tasks that are strikingly
like those of humans. This additional response is called the
uncertainty response, and it is presently interpreted to show
some species’ capacity for uncertainty monitoring and metacognition.
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the current trial with an easier one. Difficulty was varied so
as to map the dolphin’s threshold for distinguishing High
from Low.
Figure 2A shows that High responses predominated on
High trials and difficult Low trials; Low responses predominated on easier Low trials. The discrimination was performed
at chance where these two response curves cross, and the
trial-decline response was used most in this region of maximum uncertainty. The dolphin assessed accurately when he
was liable to err and he declined those trials adaptively. That
he responded Uncertain most to trials that were 14 Hz (one
eighth of a semitone) from true High trials shows that his
uncertainty responding focused on his true psychophysical
limit.

If this interpretation is correct, then these experiments tap
theoretically important cognitive capacities in animals that
could bear on their cognitive awareness and consciousness.
However, the burden of proof in this area is heavy. Morgan’s
(1906) Canon established a tradition in comparative psychology of erring toward explaining animals’ behavior at the
lowest possible psychological level. Therefore, even when
animals perform in a way that might demonstrate metacognition, researchers should consider carefully the alternative
possibility that these performances can be explained through
low-level, associative mechanisms based in stimulus cues
and reinforcement contingencies. Morgan’s Canon has seldom had a fatter target to shoot at than animal metacognition. This theoretical debate has become the area’s central
issue as researchers reflect on existing phenomena and
pause to evaluate the area’s current status (Carruthers, 2008;
Proust, 2003; Smith et al., 2008; Staddon et al., 2007). Here,
we discuss this debate and offer our evaluation of the field.
We appreciate the opportunity for a dialog on this important
issue.
Criticism begins at home. We will illustrate the interpretative tension in this field using the paradigm that initiated the
comparative study of uncertainty monitoring (Smith et al.,
1995). Smith et al. gave a bottlenosed dolphin (Figure 1)
a psychophysical threshold task. One response (High) was
correct for a repeating tone of 2,100 Hz. The other response
(Low) was correct for a repeating tone between 1,200 Hz
and 2,099 Hz. In addition to the High and Low responses,
the animal could make a trial-decline response that replaced

Figure 1. The dolphin participant in the study of Smith et al.
(1995). Photograph Credit: Dolphin Research Center, Inc.,
Grassy Key, Florida. Used with permission.
The dolphin showed his own brand of auxiliary uncertainty behaviors. On solvable trials, he swam toward the response paddles so fast that his bow wave sometimes soaked
our electronics. But he hesitated and wavered when the trial
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was uncertain. These behaviors were distributed as his uncertainty responses were (Figure 2B). Tolman (1927) was
intrigued by these behaviors that he called lookings and runnings back and forth. He thought these behaviors could define animal consciousness for the behaviorist.
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But against that high-level interpretation are important associative considerations. First, there is the problem of objective stimulus cues—the dolphin was experiencing a class of
error-causing threshold stimuli. Second, there is the problem
of transparent reinforcement—the dolphin mainly received
timeout penalties, not food rewards, for those stimuli. However, when he responded Uncertain to them, the consequence
(a new, easy trial) was possibly more positive for him. Perhaps the problematic stimuli and High and Low responses
in those stimulus contexts became slightly aversive for the
dolphin. Perhaps he was conditioned to respond Uncertain
in those stimulus contexts. That trial-decline responses were
aversion-avoidance responses would be a very different psychological matter from their being expressions of uncertainty on difficult trials.
A common practice in this wider research area increases
the force of associative interpretations. Researchers often
reward animals directly for their use of the uncertainty response (e.g., Foote & Crystal, 2007; Kornell et al., 2007;
Hampton, 2001; Inman & Shettleworth, 1999; Suda-King,
2008; Sutton & Shettleworth, 2008). This methodology
might grant the uncertainty response a positive associative
response strength independent of any metacognitive role it
plays in a task. It might be used because of its attractive reward properties. Thus, this approach makes it more difficult
to disconfirm associative descriptions or affirm metacognitive interpretations.

Figure 2. A. Performance by a dolphin in the auditory discrimination of Smith et al. (1995). The horizontal axis indicates the frequency (Hz) of the trial. The High response was
correct for tones at 2,100 Hz—these trials are represented
by the rightmost data point for each curve. All lower-pitched
tones deserved the Low response. The solid line represents
the percentage of trials receiving the Uncertain response at
each trial level. The percentages of trials ending with the
High response (dashed line) or Low response (dotted line)
are also shown. B. The dolphin’s weighted overall Factor 1
behavior (hesitancy, slowing, wavering) for tones of different frequencies (Hz). From “The Uncertain Response in the
Bottlenosed Dolphin (Tursiops truncatus),” by J. D. Smith,
J. Schull, J. Strote, K. McGee, R. Egnor, and L. Erb, 1995,
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124, p. 391,
p. 402. Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.

These three potential associative dimensions to performance—stimulus cues that could occasion aversion and
trigger avoidance, transparent reinforcement contingences
that could catalyze conditioning processes, and the positive
response strength accrued by directly rewarded uncertainty
responses—all present significant challenges to this field. In
combination, they represent the central interpretative issue
facing researchers. The next sections of this article evaluate
the explanatory weight borne by these associative mechanisms.
The Stimulus Component of Associative Interpretations
Shields et al. (1997). The dolphin experiment focused on
primary stimulus qualities (pitch height) and thus encouraged stimulus-based descriptions of performance. It left open
the possibility that specific, first-order stimuli trigger uncertainty responses. In fact, Smith et al. (2008) used formal
modeling approaches to show that some uncertainty-monitoring data patterns can indeed be explained using low-level
aversion and avoidance reactions to first-order stimuli. Accordingly, Shields et al. (1997) asked whether animals could
recruit adaptive uncertainty responses in a psychophysical
Same-Different (SD) task. The SD task requires an abstract
judgment about the relation between two stimuli that goes
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beyond the task’s absolute stimuli. This is why SD performance is difficult to train in many species and why SD performance is acknowledged to be cognitively sophisticated
(Premack, 1978; Herrnstein, 1990).
Shields et al. (1997) gave rhesus monkeys an SD density
discrimination. On each trial, two rectangles filled randomly
with lit pixels were shown. Animals were to make the Same
or Different response when the two pixel densities were the
same or different, respectively. The size of the stimulus differences on Different trials was adjusted dynamically based
on recent performance to constantly challenge subjects’ discriminative ability. In addition, Same and Different trials at
several absolute stimulus levels were intermixed to ensure a
true relational performance.
Yet monkeys, despite the difficulty and abstractness of the
SD task, still declined adaptively indeterminate stimulus relations at the crux between Same and Different (Figure 3A).
Their performance was essentially identical to that of human participants (Figure 3B)—the two performance profiles
correlated at 0.98. In this case, uncertainty responses cannot
have been triggered by low-level stimulus cues because the
relevant cue was abstract-relational in nature. In this case,
uncertainty responses had to be prompted by the indeterminacy of the relation that two highly variable stimuli instantiated. This is a performance of psychological complexity and
sophistication.
Hampton (2001); Smith et al. (1998). These two studies
also confirmed that stimulus-based interpretations of animals’ uncertainty-monitoring performances are untenable.
Hampton used the Delayed Matching to Sample task—animals had to remember a sample shape and identify it after a
forgetting interval. Smith et al. used the Serial-Probe Recognition task—animals saw a list of stimuli and then judged
whether a probe stimulus was part of that list or not. Both
studies amplified their originating paradigm by giving animals the uncertainty response with which to decline trials of
their choosing.
Both studies, too, cycled randomly through a limited set
of stimuli that were used as memory probes. All stimuli became memory probes or were the foils to memory probes
with the same frequency. All stimuli were rewarded and nonrewarded following both primary responses in the same way.
No stimulus cue ever indicated any response. Only the status
of the item as a to-be-remembered item (i.e., as a sample or
a list member) was relevant. Thus, the psychology of this
experiment unfolded along an internal continuum of subjective trace strength, with animals declining memory tests for
memories of indeterminate strength. The signal of memory
strength is very different from the signals available in traditional operant situations. The monkeys’ behavior in these

Figure 3. A. Performance by two monkeys in the Same-Different task of Shields et al., 1997. The horizontal axis gives
the ratio between the densities of the comparison box and
the standard box for trials of different disparities. The Same
response was correct for trials at a proportional box disparity of 1.0. These trials are represented by the rightmost data
points. All other trials deserved the Different response. The
solid line represents the percentage of trials receiving the
Uncertain response at each density ratio. The percentages of
trials ending with the Same response (dashed line) or Different response (dotted line) are also shown. B. Performance by
six humans in the Same-Different task, depicted in the same
way. From “Uncertain Responses by Humans and Rhesus
Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a Psychophysical Same-Different Task,” by W. E. Shields, J. D. Smith, and D. A. Washburn, 1997, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
126, p. 158. Copyright 1997 by the American Psychological
Association. Reprinted with permission.
tasks is far from traditional senses of stimulus control. In a
limited sense, these animals were showing metamemory—
they were monitoring the contents of memory to determine
their response.
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Associative theorists naturally react sharply to a claim like
this. They note that of course animals respond to internal
stimuli—but it is still stimulus control. They note that animals’ internal representations alter the objective stimulus input. Behavior is controlled by functional stimuli, not nominal, objective stimuli. They might insist that relational cues
are still controlling stimulus cues, even if they are abstract or
cognitive. They might even insist that states of memory are
controlling, internal stimuli, too.
We agree that all stimuli are internal and represented
functionally. Neither humans nor animals experience things
in themselves. However, the idea of internality misses our
point. Our point is that the level of the cognitive performance to which the uncertainty response attaches is critical
in evaluating the cognitive level of the uncertainty response
itself. If an animal reported uncertainty about whether a
philosophical proof of the existence of God had a circularity
flaw, no-one would claim that this report was an instance of
stimulus control.
Now one may think that uncertainty about an abstract
judgment of Sameness-Difference, or uncertainty about a
memory, are or are not high enough yet to quiet the stimulus-control argument. That is a matter of one’s cognitive or
associative bias. Either way, the Same-Different and memory tasks illustrate an approach. They are waypoints toward
demonstrations of animal metacognition that cognitive and
associative theorists will both endorse.
We do caution, though, against the approach of calling
everything a stimulus to preserve the idea of associationism and stimulus control. This does harm for a number of
reasons. First, it will demote patent demonstrations of conscious metacognition in humans (or animals) down to instances of behaviorism. Second, there is a theoretical casualness in making everything a stimulus, because this will blur
distinctions among performances that are profoundly different in psychological character. In our view, responding to
the indeterminacy of a conceptual relation or responding to
the dimness of a memory are profoundly different from responding to a present, aversive stimulus. But we understand
that this may not be so for everyone.
Finally, we point out that there is a strong chance that the
threshold state of indeterminacy between stimulus/response
classes is psychologically distinctive and higher-level in its
own right. For example, animals respond to internal states of
hunger. They press bars for food. They stop pressing on satiation. But, suppose a pigeon made a non-appetitive response
to report: I don’t know if I’m hungry or not, perhaps a little
peckish. This non-appetitive declaration of hunger indeterminacy would have considerable psychological complexity
(and this declaration would be consciously metacognitive in

44

humans even if responding appetitively to hunger is not).
The Reinforcement Component
of Associative Interpretations
Smith et al. (2006). The trial-by-trial reinforcement given
in many comparative uncertainty-monitoring experiments
has also encouraged reinforcement-based descriptions of
performance. This leaves open the possibility that reinforcement history allows animals to construct low-level gradients
of reward richness that could be used to trigger uncertainty
responses Smith et al.’s (2008) formal models also illustrated this possibility.
Accordingly, some researchers have worked to show that
uncertainty responses can be dissociated from a task’s reinforcement structure and history. In one example of this
approach, Smith et al. (2006) gave monkeys Sparse-Dense
psychophysical discriminations, but they also required that
the monkeys work for blocks of trials before receiving summary feedback for the entire block. During that summary, all
reinforcements for correct responses in the block were delivered first, then all penalty timeouts for errors subsequently.
In this way, feedback was rearranged out of trial-by-trial order, leaving monkeys with no way to associate reinforcement
signals to particular stimuli or particular stimulus-response
pairs. Nonetheless, one monkey of two was still able to
make adaptive uncertainty responses (Figure 4A). This subject sustained this ability even when he was moved into new
Sparse-Dense tasks (at new absolute pixel-density levels) in
which he never experienced difficult or uncertain trials except under the contingency of deferred, rearranged feedback.
(He did receive brief periods of trial-by-trial feedback on the
easiest, extreme ends of the new Sparse and Dense stimulus
continua as he entered new tasks.)
Smith et al. provided strong evidence that the reinforcement structure of this task did not determine the animal’s uncertainty-response strategy. For example, Figure 4A shows
that the monkey declined trials at the same frequency for
Density Bins 6 and 13, even though he was 95% and 24%
correct at those two trial levels, respectively, when he sometimes tried them. This is contrary to all associative interpretations. They would hold that animals should decline most
those trials with the poorest reinforcement history (i.e., Bin
13 stimuli). Yet Figure 4B shows that there was essentially no
relationship between uncertainty responding and reinforcement density in this case. The monkey was not responding to
those reinforcement-based, associative cues. His uncertainty
responses did not follow the task’s reinforcement patterning.
Instead, Smith et al. (2006) showed that this monkey’s
uncertainty responses followed his decisional organization
of the task. Figure 4C shows that this task had a subjective
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Figure 4. A monkey’s performance in the Sparse-Dense discrimination of Smith et al. (2006). A. The horizontal axis indicates the density bin of the box. The Sparse and Dense responses, respectively, were correct for boxes at Density Bins 1-13
and 14-26. The open circles show the proportion of trials attempted that were answered correctly. The dark circles show the
proportion of trials receiving the uncertainty response at each density bin. The level of uncertainty responding and correct
responding at two trial levels are singled out using red circles and green squares. B. The monkey’s performance in the same
task, but now showing his proportion of trials declined in each density bin plotted against his proportion of trials answered
correctly. Performance at Density Bins 6 and 13 are singled out using red circles. C. The monkey’s performance in the same
task, but now showing separately his use of the Sparse and Dense responses (open circles and open triangles). The vertical
line indicates the monkey’s subjective discrimination breakpoint at Density Bin 9. D. The monkey’s performance in the same
task, but now showing his proportion of trials declined in each density bin plotted against the decisional distance of the bin
from his decisional breakpoint (Bin 9 = 0; Bins 8 and 10 = 1; Bins 7 and 11 = 2, etc.). From “Dissociating Uncertainty
States and Reinforcement Signals in the Comparative Study of Metacognition,” by J. D. Smith, M. J. Beran, J. S. Redford,
and D. A. Washburn, 2006, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, p. 292. Copyright 2006 by the American
Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.
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breakpoint at Bin 9 for the monkey. This is where his Sparse
and Dense curves crossed. This was his discrimination breakpoint. His uncertainty responding was symmetrical about
that breakpoint, and he declined fewer trials as they were
farther from that breakpoint (note again: reinforcement was
not symmetrical about that breakpoint). Figure 4D shows
that understanding the monkey’s uncertainty responding decisionally in this way explains well his use of the uncertainty
response.
Thus, this monkey showed that an animal can organize
a decisional framework for a task—with two response criteria defining three response regions—absent trial-by-trial
signals of reinforcement. He also showed that the decisional
patterning of a task can be dissociated from that task’s reinforcement patterning. This is the first dissociation of its
kind in the animal uncertainty-monitoring literature, and it
speaks against many associative descriptions of animals’
performance in those tasks.
Couchman et al. (submitted). Couchman et al. carried
this demonstration further. Whereas Smith et al. (2006) had
moved monkeys from one Sparse-Dense discrimination to
another (e.g., from a Sparse-Dense discrimination involving
absolutely sparse stimuli into a Sparse-Dense discrimination
involving absolutely dense stimuli), Couchman et al. moved
monkeys across qualitatively different task contexts. For example, a monkey trained on a Sparse-Dense discrimination
was later moved into discriminations involving shorter-longer lines or rounded-flattened ellipses. Crucially, some of
these tasks could not be solved on the basis of pixel illumination or density as in the Sparse-Dense task. Monkeys
performed these tasks in blocks of trials without direct reinforcement and were still able to adaptively use the uncertainty response for the most difficult trials. This shows a level
of cognitive monitoring that goes beyond low-level associations because associations learned in one task context would
not be useful in the next. It also shows that monkeys have
at least some capacity for self-learning and self-instruction
under conditions of deferred and delayed reinforcement. As
part of that capacity, they evidently can recognize difficult
and error-causing stimuli, and construct adaptive regions of
behavioral uncertainty, absent immediate reinforcement signals.
Reinforcement is a linchpin of associative accounts of
learning and behavior. This is true no matter the exact character of the associative account (S-R, S-S, etc.). It is true no
matter the exact character of one’s theory of discrimination
learning (componential, configural, etc.). But in the studies
just described, reinforcement—a primary driving force behind the formation of associations—was dissociated away as
an interpretative factor. The monkeys’ uncertainty-monitoring performances in these tasks are far from traditional sens-
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es of associative learning. This is an additional constraint on
psychological theorizing about animals’ uncertainty monitoring. It shows that animals’ uncertainty responses can occur at a cognitive, decisional psychological level that is dissociable from a task’s reinforcement structure.
This dissociation is a necessary and constructive step toward the inference that non-human species have something
like a metacognitive capacity. However, we caution that it
is somewhat artificial to completely dissociate reinforcement cues away from uncertain situations. Not only are errors, punishments, and uncertainty strongly co-occurrent,
but also error and punishment are important teachable moments by which life signals uncertainty, doubt, danger, lack
of knowledge, and domain non-expertise. A valid, important part of metacognition comes from this instruction and
the organism’s behavioral response to it. In the longer run
of empirical study in this area, these aspects of cognitive
monitoring—unfortunately lost in reinforcement’s dissociation—should be studied in animals as well as humans.
The Direct Rewards Given to Uncertainty Responses
Finally, researchers have now shown that animals still
make adaptive uncertainty responses even when those responses bring no hint, no information, no easy next trial, no
direct food reward, and no reward token, but only the next
randomly chosen trial. For example, Beran et al. (2006) had
two rhesus monkeys judge arrays of dots as having more
or fewer dots than a center value that was never presented
in trials (Figure 5A). Monkeys were also given an uncertainty response that let them decline to make a numerosity
judgment whenever they chose. Across center values (3-7)
that shifted across sessions, the most errors occurred for the
numerosities nearest the center value. Monkeys also used
the uncertainty response most often for those most difficult
numerosities (Figure 5B). This research joins that in Smith
et al. (2006) in showing monkeys’ use of the purest uncertainty response possible, uncontaminated by any secondary
positive motivator. Therefore, this third dimension of the associative challenge falls away in the end as well.
A Misconception about Signal-Detection Models
of Uncertainty-Monitoring
Many times it is useful to model animals’ uncertaintymonitoring performances (e.g., Smith et al., 2003). These
models frequently have a signal-detection character (Green
& Swets, 1966; MacMillan & Creelman, 1991), though this
is a choice of convenience and though other modeling frameworks might serve as well. Signal-detection models assume
that performance is organized along an ordered series (a continuum) of psychological representations of changing impact
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leftmost reserved for one primary discrimination response,
the rightmost for the other discrimination response, and the
middle region demarcating indeterminate cognitive states
that should receive uncertainty responses.
Regarding this descriptive framework, a serious misconception has arisen. In essence it states: if the general framework of the signal-detection model applies to a behavioral
situation, then this shows directly that the performance can
be, and should be, interpreted in a low-level, first-order, associative manner. This misinterpretation needs to be corrected, because it is a common view, because it is mistaken, and
because it does harm to theoretical progress in this area.
Of course in some cases associative descriptions will be
appropriate. If the underlying continuum concerns stimulus
generalization, response strength, or aversion-avoidance,
then, yes, the signal-detection model would be about lowlevel, associative mechanisms

Figure 5. A. The screen from a numerosity-judgment trial
in Experiment 2 of Beran et al. (2006). B. Performance by
a monkey as a function of array size. Green circles indicate
the percentage of trials correct in the primary numerosity
discrimination when it was attempted. Red circles indicate
the percentage of trials on which the uncertainty response
was selected for each array size. From “Rhesus Macaques
(Macaca mulatta) Monitor Uncertainty during Numerosity
Judgments,” by M. J. Beran, J. D. Smith, J. S. Redford, and
D. A. Washburn, 2006, Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Animal Behavior Processes, 32, p. 113, p. 117. Copyright
2006 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted
with permission.
or increasing strength (memory strength, confidence level,
etc.). They assume that the subject establishes response regions by placing decision criteria along the continuum of
cognitive states. By the usual metacognitive interpretation
of the referent experiments, one would assume that there are
upper and lower criteria defining three response regions, the

But, in other cases, associative descriptions will be inappropriate. For the underlying cognitive continuum may
also concern higher-level cognitive representations or even
metacognitive states, such as degrees of conscious certainty,
levels of confidence in retrieved memories, gradations of intensity of tip-of-the-tongue states, and so forth. Note that the
signal-detection model will be suitable even when the performance is fully conscious, metacognitive, and reportable
through language. That is, any metacognitive performance
that humans would ever show could be described using the
same signal-detection framework, but by all accounts none
of them would deserve to have Morgan’s Canon aimed at
them. Likewise, the previous sections of this article have
shown that in many cases the primary stimulus basis for association is not there, nor are the reinforcement signals that
could fuel association. Without association’s ground and
spark, it cannot occur. Another psychological description is
required, even though a signal-detection model fits the data.
Perhaps we can partly explain why this misunderstanding
arises. Many times, comparative models instantiate mathematically parameters that are strongly grounded in low-level
psychological processes in mind or brain. For example, timing/counting models envision duration or event accumulators
and comparators that may even reflect the neurophysiology
of timing/counting. Perhaps it is natural, then, that modelers assume a model’s mathematics to be instantiating lowlevel processes. However, this assumption does not apply
to the models used in fitting animal’s uncertainty-monitoring performances. The reason for this is that no one knows
how the animal or human organizes the decision criteria that
define the regions of uncertainty responding in these tasks.
This could be done associatively or consciously. Even if one
uses Morgan’s Canon to grant the low-level interpretation
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provisional priority, this priority evaporates once one discovers that those decision criteria are evidently organized
cognitively, decisionally, abstractly, and dissociably from
the task’s reinforcement signals. Then, a willful suspension
of the low-level bias is the appropriate scientific stance.
Meanwhile, this misunderstanding has a significant cost to
the field because it artificially equalizes phenomena that may
be qualitatively different in psychological level and character. Indeed, it ignores the psychological content of performances (their representations, their processes) to focus on
a metaphorical, formal similarity. Worst of all, it lumps together phenomena in order to dismiss them, when what the
field actually needs is to parse phenomena and separate them
carefully so as to understand them clearly.
We stress that this field needs to keep its focus sharply
on the cognitive processes and representations that underlie
uncertainty-monitoring performance, not on their suitability
for signal-detection modeling. That suitability has no conceivable relationship to or implication for the level or character of a psychological performance.
A Misunderstanding about Reinforcement in
Uncertainty-Monitoring Tasks
There is an additional concern about existing associative
explanations of uncertainty-monitoring performances. These
explanations often contain statements to this effect: Naturally
animals use the uncertainty response, for it reduces the delay
to reinforcement in subsequent trials because it is never followed by a timeout. Reduction in delay to reinforcement is
itself reinforcing, and this is the likely basis for uncertainty
responding. This claim is a version of the common claim by
associative theorists that reinforcement rate over time is the
molar and critical factor determining choice.
But these explanations are also mistaken. This is a case
wherein associative theorists have not given sufficient attention to the animal’s real situation in an uncertainty-monitoring task. It is not the case that the uncertainty response
speeds up the time to the next reward. If the uncertainty response were used on every trial, in many experiments there
would be no rewards given, ever—the uncertainty response
would produce an indefinite delay until reward. Or, if the animal used the uncertainty response on easy trials that would
almost certainly bring reward, it would delay reward by several seconds each time.
Indeed, the use of the uncertainty response will only
speed up the arrival of the next reward under narrow circumstances—that is, if the animal can use it adaptively and
selectively to decline only the most difficult trials in the discrimination. But, to do so, the animal must have some way
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to monitor either difficulty or the risk of error, so that it can
decline trials in that range. In essence, the associative claim
about speeded-up rewards only stands if the animal has an
adaptive uncertainty-monitoring performance at work in the
background. But, in that case, the metacognitive dog is wagging the associative tail.
Regarding this misunderstanding, we would caution our
field that there is also a theoretical casualness in attributing a
wide range of behavioral patterns to the molar maximization
of reinforcement. Once again, this is liable to blur distinctions among performances that are profoundly different in
psychological character. Put another way, the reward-maximization description is often functionally correct, but psychologically empty. One still needs to come to understand
the cognitive representations and processes that allow this
maximization to occur (are they conscious and deliberative,
or low-level and reactive). On doing so, the psychological
description will explain the behavioral pattern more theoretically richly than will the reward-maximization description.
Phylogenetic Studies of Uncertainty Monitoring and
Associative Interpretations
Finally, the growing body of cross-species research on uncertainty monitoring also speaks against the possibility that
uncertainty-monitoring performances reflect low-level associative mechanisms based in stimuli and reinforcement.
Beran et al. (in press). For example, Beran et al. (in press)
gave six capuchins (New World Monkeys, family Cebidae) two density discrimination tasks. In the Sparse-Uncertainty-Dense task, difficult trials at the breakpoint between
Sparse and Dense could be declined through an uncertainty
response. This was a standard uncertainty-monitoring task
in which rhesus monkeys (Old World Monkeys, family Cercopithecidae) have commonly used the uncertainty response
adaptively. In the Sparse-Middle-Dense task, making a middle response to the same intermediate stimuli could be rewarded. This was a standard, three-response discrimination,
in which associative mechanisms might encourage middle
responses for middle stimuli. Capuchins essentially did not
use the uncertainty response at all (Figure 6A). But they used
the middle perceptual response easily (Figure 6B).
Beran et al. (in press) then used formal optimality studies
to examine the reinforcement landscape of the uncertainty
task. They found ways to raise the associative stakes in the
task, so that now the capuchins had a strong motivation to
learn to use that uncertainty response adaptively. To accomplish this, Beran et al. increased the penalty timeout in the
uncertainty task to 90s, more than quadrupling the time cost
for each error and increasing the advantage to be gained
from declining difficult trials. Now, the capuchins gave up
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potentially 30 trials for each penalty timeout (because correctly answered trials lasted about 3 s). In addition, Beran et
al. eliminated from the task the easiest trial levels, so that the
overall reinforcement rate in the task went down. This ensured that the capuchins were not just satisficing: accepting
a decent reinforcement return based on a cognitively easy
task strategy that did not incorporate the effortful uncertain-

way, their associative competence would have also let them
make uncertainty responses adaptively. If uncertainty responding was just a matter of distributing available responses to globally maximize the rate of rewards, they would have
done so as well. But they did not. Taking the uncertainty
and middle results together, one sees that each animal acted
as its own control, in the sense that uncertainty responding
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Figure 6. The performance of six capuchin monkeys in the Sparse-Uncertainty-Dense task of Beran et al. (2009). The horizontal axis indicates the density level of the box. The Sparse and Dense responses, respectively, were correct for boxes at
Density Levels 1-21 and 22-42. The solid line represents the percentage of trials receiving the Uncertain response at each
trial level. The percentages of trials ending with the Dense response (dashed line) or Sparse (dotted line) are also shown.
B. The performance of the same capuchin monkeys in the Sparse-Middle-Dense task of Beran et al. (2009), depicted in a
similar way. From “The Psychological Organization of ‘Uncertainty’ Responses and ‘Middle’ Responses: A Dissociation
in Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella),” by M. J. Beran, J. D. Smith, M. V. C. Coutinho, J. J. Couchman, and J. B. Boomer,
2009, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, in press. Copyright 2009 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.
ty response. Even then, in this second experiment, five of the
six capuchins showed essentially no use of the uncertainty
response. One animal did use that response now, though he
may have done so because the repeated alternation of middle
and uncertainty tasks had finally taught him that uncertainty
and middle responses were fungible.
These experiments have an important implication. The
middle task defined a class of middle discriminative stimuli
that animals could use to anchor associative processes. Middle stimuli were transparently reinforced, allowing associative mechanisms to operate and associative connections to
form. Clearly, those associative processes operated well in
the capuchins. They responded middle sensitively and accurately.
If uncertainty responding was associatively based in a like

and middle responding were manipulated within animals in
an alternating and counterbalanced way. Clearly, the psychological mechanism that underlies uncertainty responding
is different from the associative mechanism that underlies
middle responding. Uncertainty responding is responsive
to some psychological signal that capuchin monkeys barely
monitored in this task. The performances are qualitatively
different. One performance is associatively based, the other
is not. One performance maximized reward density, one did
not. These animals didn’t reward maximize in the uncertainty task because they didn’t apprehend appropriately that
task’s psychological signals. The psychology of the situation
was in explanatory control over the animals’ behavioral patterns, not their need to maximize rewards or their ability to
establish associative connections.
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Inman and Shettleworth (1999); Sutton and Shettleworth
(2008). These studies on pigeons made a similar point. Pigeons have consistently refused to express an uncertaintymonitoring capacity, even though in the relevant experiments
they have been directly rewarded with food for making uncertainty responses. Shettleworth and her colleagues have
concluded that pigeons either lack a capacity for cognitive
monitoring, or else they express that capacity with such difficulty that experimenters can hardly show it. Yet no one
would say that pigeons are associatively challenged—they
are not. If there were patent associative mechanisms and
cues available in those tasks, pigeons would find and use
them, and reward maximize by producing the uncertaintymonitoring data pattern. Because they do not, one sees again
that a different, non-associative psychological description of
the uncertainty-monitoring task is required.
Controlled, Decisional Processes
in Uncertainty-Monitoring Tasks
A crucial conclusion from this discussion is that animals
have transcended the basic associative mechanisms that have
been proposed. Not every time, but sufficiently for the relevant existence proofs. Other approaches to associative interpretations contain misunderstandings as discussed above.
In some cases, therefore, animals in their performances have
gone to the next psychological level. Humans in their theorizing have not. Another crucial conclusion is that theoretical
development in this area lags behind empirical development.
Researchers are still focused on asserting or refuting associative interpretations—one sees this focus in the present
article. Consequently, the field has not found the new cognitive-decisional description of animals’ performances that is
warranted and necessary for further theoretical advancement
in this area. In this section, we outline some aspects of this
description.
Consider a traditional, auditory-threshold task. Silent intervals deserve the No Sound response. Intervals containing a faint, 50%-detectable (threshold) sound deserve the
Sound response. In this situation, only two events can occur.
Two responses map exhaustively to those events—all events
deserve one response or the other. There is no intermediate
stimulus class that could ground associative processing. This
is not a Red-Yellow discrimination with the possibility of
attaching a third response to Orange in between. Here there
is no “orange,” because the whole psychological range of
the threshold task plays out within a single JND. So, there
is nothing between Sound and No Sound except Sound-No
Sound indeterminacy. This is why—logically—one knows
that uncertainty responding in a task of this kind is about
resolving indeterminacy. This is why even associative theorists acknowledge that threshold states are psychologically
unique. The rules of stimulus control are different there,

50

animals have difficulty finding adaptive solutions there, animals become minimally informed observers there, and there
are not stimuli there on which to ground operants or conditioned reflexes (Boneau & Cole, 1967; Commons et al.,
1991; Davison et al., 1985; Miller et al., 1980; Terman &
Terman, 1972). The classical psychophysicists agreed that
the threshold state is psychologically complex (Boring, 1920;
Fernberger, 1914; George, 1917; Thomson, 1920; Watson et
al., 1973; Woodworth, 1938). A threshold event is not the
clear stimulus signal that can ground a reflexive response.
A threshold event is about the failure to assign an event to a
stimulus class. It is about the failure to know which reactive
response to make. The laws of association and conditioning
break down near threshold, and this helps explain why the
psychology of threshold is still poorly understood.
However, one can describe the psychological structure
of uncertainty-monitoring tasks, or indeterminacy-resolution tasks, in a way that advances us toward understanding
these performances across tasks and species. Shiffrin and
Schneider (1977) analyzed the information-processing consequences of cognitive indeterminacy. Indeterminate mental
representations necessarily map inconsistently and unreliably onto behavioral responses. This makes those representations inadequate behavioral indicators. Consequently, the
organism must invoke higher levels of controlled cognitive
processes to adjudicate and resolve the indeterminacy. An
important theoretical statement follows from this. All the uncertainty-monitoring tasks are inconsistently mapped in Shiffrin and Schneider’s sense All would benefit from controlled
processing (slow, deliberate, etc.). This is true of the dolphin
caught at threshold, 14 HZ from the standard at 2,100 HZ.
It is true for monkeys needing to handle ambiguous memory
traces (e.g., Hampton, 2001; Hampton et al., 2004; Smith
et al., 1998). Atkinson and Juola (1974) also suggested that
indeterminate memory traces require qualitatively different,
secondary information-processing strategies.
To grasp intuitively the situation animals face in uncertainty-monitoring tasks, consider your cognitive processes
in a world in which traffic lights gradually morphed, pixel by
pixel, between red and green, and you had to decide whether
your light was Red Enough to Stop or Green Enough To Go.
Gone would be all the associative clarity of the Stop and Go
operants and their conditioned emotional and response contents. Instead, approaching a light, you would set in motion
an elaborate criterion-setting process that would include—
sadly—your schedule, the speed of opposing traffic, guilt,
ethics, the proximity of police vehicles, the points already
on your license, whether your children were watching from
the back seat, and so forth. Criterion-setting at threshold is
a qualitatively different thing from associative responding,
and this field needs sophisticated theories of this kind of performance to apply to animals’ uncertainty-monitoring per-
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formances.
In short, psychophysical procedures ensure indeterminate
stimulus-response mappings and encourage controlled decision-making no matter the species. Uncertainty responses to
threshold states probably represent a controlled decision, on
the threshold of perception or memory, to decline the trial.
This realization grants animals’ uncertainty responses some
of the cognitive sophistication that is due them, without
loading them down with consciousness or other human concomitants of metacognition.
Conclusion
In this new area of comparative inquiry, researchers have
found innovative ways to ask animals difficult psychological questions concerning their metacognitive capacities. It is
natural that associative concerns have arisen as part of this
research program. It is natural that the field would pause to
evaluate its problems and prospects. On doing so, it is clear
that this field shows encouraging signs of progress, including this special discussion forum, the many insightful scholars who have engaged this research, and the crucial fact that
animals sometimes transcend reasonable associative interpretations to show genuine uncertainty-monitoring performances.
Accordingly, we believe it is a good time for theory in
this area to ratchet up a level to meet animals’ uncertaintymonitoring performances, and to consider with careful models and psychological descriptions the cognitive-decisional
performances that animals show. What kind of controlled
processing do animals demonstrate in these tasks? Are these
processes executive, explicit, declarative—possibly even
conscious? These and related questions of psychological interpretation have been held in abeyance while the associative
issue dominated. However, these new questions will open up
along with the field’s theoretical horizon, and new insights
will emerge as they become the focus of this growing field.
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